The effect of temporary parental benefit on children’s antibiotics use: Evidence from a natural field experiment by Wickström Östervall, Linnea et al.
  
Recommended Citation 
Wickström Östervall, L.,  Hahlin, A., Lundevall, A. (2019). Effect of Temporary Parental Benefit 
on Children’s Antibiotics Use: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment. Review of Economics 
and Institutions, 10(1), Article 2. doi: 10.5202/rei.v10i1.286  
Retrieved from http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/286        
 
Copyright © 2019 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 
 
Review of  
ECONOMICS 
and  
INSTITUTIONS 
Review of Economics and Institutions  
www.rei.unipg.it 
ISSN 2038-1379  DOI:10.5202/rei.v10i1.286 
 Vol. 10 – No. 1, Spring-Summer 2019 – Article 2 
 
 
The Effect of Temporary Parental Benefit on Children’s 
Antibiotics Use: Evidence from a Natural Field 
Experiment 
 
Linnea Wickström 
Östervall * 
Annika Hahlin Astrid Lundevall 
 Lund University  Strama Stockholm  Strama Stockholm 
   
   
	
Abstract:	Prudent	use	of	antibiotics	is	important	to	delay	the	spread	of	resistance.	This	
paper	 analyses	 the	 effect	 on	 children’s	 antibiotics	 use	 of	 a	 reform	 of	 the	 temporary	
parental	benefit	 in	Sweden.	The	reform	increased	the	maximum	compensation	for	this	
benefit.	 The	 level	 of	 compensation	 for	 social	 security	 may	 affect	 the	 propensity	 of	 a	
patient	 or	 parent	 to	 push	 for	 a	 prescription	 for	 antibiotics,	 as	 a	 less	 generous	
compensation	 makes	 it	 more	 expensive	 to	 be	 absent	 from	 work	 and	 since	 there	 is	
widespread	overconfidence	 in	 the	 effectiveness	of	 antibiotics.	Using	municipality	 level	
data,	we	 show	 that	 the	 reform	 resulted	 in	 a	 reduction	 in	 children’s	 antibiotics	 use	 by	
about	 five	 per	 cent.	 The	 result	 is	 fairly	 robust	 to	 alternative	 empirical	 strategies,	
suggesting	that	welfare	policies	can	have	important	indirect	effects	that	should	be	taken	
into	account.	
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1 Introduction 
This paper explores the effect on children’s antibiotics use of a reform of 
the temporary parental benefit in Sweden. Welfare benefits may influence 
how eager the patient or parent is to ask for a prescription for antibiotics. 
Less generous sickness benefits, coupled with a widespread 
overconfidence in the effectiveness of antibiotics, may increase the 
demand for antibiotics.1 Overuse of antibiotics, in turn, leads to a faster 
spread of resistance, with important consequences for public health. 
Antimicrobial resistance is an important policy issue at both 
international and national level. The discovery of antibiotics is one of the 
most important breakthroughs in medical history, and revolutionized the 
treatment of patients with bacterial infections. Antibiotics have 
contributed to reducing the mortality and morbidity from bacterial 
infections, and have become essential in modern medicine. Without them, 
procedures such as transplantation, chemotherapy for cancer and 
orthopaedic surgery could not be performed. Misuse and overuse of 
antibiotics, however, have resulted in the emergence of resistant bacteria 
(Barbosa and Levy, 2000). Prudent use of antibiotics can limit the spread of 
resistant bacteria, and help securing effective antibiotics for future 
generations. Since 1998 the World Health Assembly (WHA, the 
decision-making body of the World Health Organization, WHO) has 
adopted several resolutions, with recommendations to members on 
prudent use of antibiotics, to delay the spread of resistance (WHO, 2001; 
WHO, 2014). Unfortunately, many prescribers, patients and parents tend 
to overestimate the effect of antibiotics in non-severe bacterial infections 
leading to excessive use. It is estimated that in as much as 50 per cent of 
the cases antibiotics are used when not needed, or in the wrong – and 
hence inefficient – dose (CDC, 2013).2 
We explore the effect on children’s antibiotics use of a more generous 
compensation for temporary parental leave to care for a sick child. We 
exploit an increase in the cap for this benefit, for exogenous variation in 
the level of compensation. Two different approaches to a 
difference-in-difference estimation over time and across municipalities are 
employed, in addition to a triple difference over time and across 
municipalities as well as age groups. All results support the hypothesis 
that an increase in the maximum amount of compensation reduces 
antibiotics use among children of relevant ages, if their parents are 
plausibly affected by the reform. 
Our results indicate that the increased benefit cap led to a reduction by 
about five per cent in antibiotics use among children in municipalities 
where mean income is at or above the old cap; i.e. in municipalities where 
                                                
1 For evidence on overconfidence see e.g. Mainous et al. (1997); for overconfidence in 
Sweden in particular, see e.g. André et al. (2010). 
2 This estimate is for the US. In Sweden the figures are probably a bit less gloomy, but 
still about 30-40 per cent. 
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parents were more likely affected by the reform. Similar or larger effects 
are estimated in alternative specifications. These results are driven by a 
very large effect among pre-schoolers, whose antibiotics use is reduced by 
about eighteen per cent, relative to older children. 
2 Background and Related Literature 
This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of social benefits 
and optimal policy. There is a large literature within economics analysing 
unemployment benefits, and a small but growing literature on sickness 
benefits (see Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006 for a review of research on 
unemployment benefits; and Hall and Hartman, 2010; Johansson and 
Palme, 2005; Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2010, 2014 for sickness benefits).3 
These studies have in common that the direct effects – typically on labour 
supply and/or absenteeism – are estimated. When addressing the 
question on how optimal levels of compensation in social security benefit 
systems can be determined, we should also consider which factors should 
be taken into account when striking the balance between compensating for 
income loss and avoiding excess use. There may be additional, indirect 
effects, with important policy implications. This paper addresses one 
particular such factor: The level of compensation for social security may 
affect antibiotics use. This is an important indirect effect, as prudent use of 
antibiotics is vital to delay the spread of resistance. 
Previous studies on the effect of (changes in) social benefits on sick 
leave/absenteeism focus on adult workers’ absence from work and usage 
of benefits. Typical outcomes studied are number of sick spells and 
duration of spells. In general the results are in line with the theoretical 
prediction, i.e. increased usage when benefits become more generous and 
vice versa. (Hall and Hartman, 2010; Johansson and Palme, 2005; Ziebarth 
and Karlsson, 2010, 2014.) This paper is related, but differs in its focus on 
an indirect effect of a compensation program, namely the effect on 
children’s antibiotics use of a reform of the temporary parental benefit. 
Earlier studies in Sweden have shown large differences in antibiotics 
use across socio-economic strata. Socio-economic factors influence 
antibiotics use, in particular among children aged 0-6 years, with higher 
antibiotics use in areas with high average family income and a high 
employment rate, than in areas with large shares of blue-collar workers, 
people with foreign background and recipients of social benefit 
(Henricson et al., 1998). These findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that the level of compensation in welfare benefits can be an important 
determinant for the use of antibiotics. In particular, a cap for the level of 
compensation implies relatively lower level of compensation, for those 
with higher incomes. Fogelberg (2013) find that increased competition for 
                                                
3 Krueger and Meyer’s chapter (2002) “Labor supply effects of social insurance” in 
Handbook of Public Economics does not cover sick leave benefits. 
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patients between clinics increases antibiotics prescriptions. This suggests 
that at least to some extent overdemand does translate into overuse. 
3 Institutional Background 
In Sweden, a parent or other caregiver can receive temporary parental 
benefit, when staying home from work to take care of a sick child aged less 
than 12 years. An important restriction is that parents may not use the 
temporary parental benefit for a sick child, if they are already on regular 
parental leave to care for this child. Various aspects of this benefit, such as 
maximum number of days per year, level of compensation, and rules for 
receiving them have been altered several times since they were first 
introduced in 1974.4 We focus on a recent change in the compensation. 
The compensation is about 80 per cent of the so-called sickness benefit 
qualifying income – basically annual income – up to a cap. The cap is 
expressed in terms of a price base amount, which is adjusted annually. 
The price base amounts for the years 2005 and 2006 are presented in Table	1 
July 1 2006 the cap was raised, from seven point five, to ten times the price 
base amount (this corresponds to an increase from SEK 297,750 to SEK 
397,000 per annum). Due to a change in government, as well as increased 
concern about misuse, this raised cap was only in effect for six months; 
January 1 2007 it was reduced to the original seven point five times the 
price base amount. The raised cap affected anyone with a monthly salary 
of more than SEK 24,812.50 (in 2006). The impact of the reform on the level 
of compensation was largest for those with an income above the old cap 
and at or below the new cap, i.e. with a monthly salary in the range from 
about SEK 24,800 to SEK 33,100. 
 
Table	1	The	Price	Base	Amount	Annually	for	Years	2005-2006	
Year	 Price	base	amount	(SEK)	
2005	 39,400	
2006	 39,700	
 
Antibiotics are by prescription only in Sweden. 
4 Empirical Strategy 
The main hypothesis is that the increase in the maximum amount of 
compensation reduces demand for antibiotics to children aged 1-11 years, 
if their parents – or at least one of their parents – are affected by the 
reform, such that the level of compensation is increased, when they stay 
home from work to take care of a sick child. 
                                                
4 For an overview (in Swedish) see Swedish Social Insurance Agency (2007). 
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It should be noted that we may find an effect on children’s antibiotics 
use regardless of any change in the number of days their parents claim this 
temporary parental benefit, when the compensation level changes. While 
effective antibiotics are vital to cure more serious infections, they typically 
have negligible or even no effect on recovery time in cases of 
uncomplicated infections (Little et al., 1997; Little et al., 2005; Neumark et 
al., 2007; Williamson et al., 2007). Hence, on average we would expect little 
or no effect on the number of sick days, and we may see a decrease in 
children’s antibiotics use independently of any change in number of days 
they are home sick. In other words, since parents typically believe that 
antibiotics will lead to a more speedy recovery, they demand antibiotics 
for their children, when staying home to take care of sick children is 
costly. The increased cap makes it less costly to stay home, for parents 
affected by the reform. However, since antibiotics typically have no or 
only negligible effect on the duration of illness in case of common 
infections, there will be no, or only very limited, effect on the number of 
sick days. 
A general problem, when studying how social benefits impact various 
decisions, is to isolate a causal effect. Typically, compensation level is tied 
to the worker’s earnings history, which is likely to be highly correlated 
with taste for work, e.g. ambitions typically manifested in exerted effort, 
interest in signalling to the employer that work is prioritized, and actual 
priorities over work – leisure. Hence, it is hard to disentangle the effect of 
the benefits, from direct effects of different tastes for work (see e.g. the 
discussion in Pettersson-Lidbom and Skogman Thoursie, 2013). To 
overcome this identification problem, we exploit a natural experiment, 
and employ a difference-in-difference strategy on municipality level data. 
In 2006 the cap for the level of compensation, when staying home to take 
care of a sick child, was raised in Sweden. As the reform only affected 
parents with incomes at or above the old cap, we can exploit the variation 
over time, between parents affected and not affected by the reform. 
With this municipality level data, we estimate the effect of the reform 
comparing antibiotics use among children, whose parents are eligible for 
temporary parental benefit, in municipalities where mean income is at or 
above the old cap, to that in municipalities with mean income below the 
old cap. This binary treatment indicator gives us the effect of the reform in 
municipalities where parents are more likely affected by the reform. In an 
alternative specification, we estimate how antibiotics use varies with the 
share of working age population with an income at or above the old cap. 
This approximately continuous treatment variable serves as a proxy for 
the extent to which parents are affected by the reform. It gives us an 
estimate of what the effect would be, if a municipality went from a zero 
share to a share equal to one. We multiply this estimate with the mean 
share, to get an estimate of the effect of the reform for municipalities with 
(close to the) average share of population with an income at or above the 
old cap. This approximately continuous treatment variable might give a 
better estimate of the general effect of the reform. However, as will 
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become clear below, the estimates with these two different treatment 
variables are comparable. 
Further, we also exploit the fact that older children are not affected, as 
their parents are no longer eligible for temporary parental leave, along 
with the proxy for the difference in the extent to which parents are 
affected by the reform, estimating the effect over time, across age groups 
and municipalities. 
In our first approach, to estimate the causal effect of the increase in the 
cap on antibiotics use among children whose parents are eligible for 
temporary parental benefit, we estimate the following base specification 
on municipality level data: 
 𝑙𝑛 𝑦!" = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 𝑇!×𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇! + 𝛼!𝑇! + 𝛼!𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇! + 𝜇!"     (1) 
 
where 𝑦!" is prescriptions per child aged 2-11 years in municipality m 
in time period t, 𝑇! is a dummy equal to one if mean income of the 
working age population in municipality m is greater than or equal to 
seven point five price base amounts, and 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇! is a dummy equal to one 
from July 2006. Municipality and monthly time fixed effects are 
subsequently added. Antibiotics use is typically higher during flu season. 
A dummy equal to one for the months October through March is 
included, to capture this seasonal pattern. As data is by age on New Year’s 
Eve, children who are one year old at that point in time are typically still 
at home with a parent, and this group is thus excluded. Similarly, children 
who are twelve years old by New Year’s Eve are excluded, as their parents 
are only eligible for temporary parental leave to care for them when they 
are ill till they turned twelve. 
Using the shares of the working age population with incomes at or 
above the old cap, interacted with a dummy equal to one after the cap was 
raised, we estimate the following specification: 
 𝑙𝑛 𝑦!" = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 𝜗!×𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇! + 𝛼!𝜗! + 𝛼!𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇! + 𝜇!"     (2) 
 
where 𝑦!"  is again prescriptions per child aged 2-11 years in 
municipality m in time period t. 𝜗! is the share of the population in 
municipality m that has an income in the category covering the relevant 
range of seven point five to ten price base amounts.5 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇! as before is a 
dummy equal to one from July 2006. Municipality and monthly time fixed 
effects are included, along with the dummy for flu season. 
                                                
5 Data is only available for rather broad income categories. The category covering the 
relevant range is SEK 20,000-39,000 per month; this corresponds to an annual income in 
the range SEK 240,000- 468,000. 
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Exploiting variation in how the reform affects different age groups, and 
in the proxy for the extent to which parents are affected by the reform, we 
relate the change in antibiotics use among children, whose parents are 
eligible for temporary parental benefit when they are sick, to that of older 
children, whose parents are not. We estimate the following specification: 𝑙𝑛 𝑦!" = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 𝐼!×𝜗!× 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇!  +  𝛼!𝐼! + 𝛼!𝜗! + 𝛼!𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇! + 𝜇!"          (3) 
 
where 𝑦!" is prescriptions per child in municipality m time period t, 
and 𝐼! is an indicator variable equal to one for children aged eleven years 
or less.6 As above, 𝜗! is the share of the population in municipality m 
that has an income in the category covering the relevant range of seven 
point five to ten price base amounts, and 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇! is a dummy equal to one 
from July 2006. Again, municipality and monthly time fixed effects are 
included, along with the dummy for flu season and age fixed effects 
capturing systematic variation in the prevalence of infections. 
To tease out where the effect is strongest, this is also estimated 
separately for preschool children and school aged children, whose parents 
are still eligible for temporary parental leave, versus older children. 
That is, we estimate differences-in-differences over time and across 
municipalities (equation 1 and 2) and a triple difference, over time and 
across age groups as well as municipalities (equation 3). 
5 Measures  
Data on prescriptions by age group and municipality is from the 
National Board of Health and Welfare.7 This prescription data is available 
by month from July 2005. We use data for the period July 2005 – December 
2006. Children aged 2-11 years old are included in the main analysis. We 
exclude children aged one year, since parents in Sweden are typically on 
parental leave at least the first year, often 15-18 months. Parents cannot be 
on temporary parental leave to take care of a sick child, if they are already 
on (regular) parental leave to care for that child. When children turn 
twelve, parents are no longer eligible for temporary parental leave to care 
for them when they are ill. Hence, we exclude also children aged twelve 
and up. 
                                                
6 The youngest children are once more excluded, as they are special cases: In Sweden 
parents are typically on parental leave at least the first year, often 15-18 months. Parents 
cannot be on temporary parental leave to take care of a sick child, if they are already on 
(regular) parental leave to care for that child. 
7 The National Board of Health and Welfare is a government agency in Sweden under 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs; now part of The Public Health Agency of 
Sweden. 
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Data on income, demographics, unemployment, and price base amount 
is from Statistics Sweden. Income and demographics are available by 
municipality; unemployment is only available by county. Statistics 
Sweden also provides a key to which municipalities belong to which 
county. The data from Statistics Sweden is available by year. Income data 
is only available for rather broad categories. The category covering the 
relevant range is SEK 20,000-39,000 per month; this corresponds to an 
annual income in the range SEK 240,000- 468,000. 
6 Descriptive Statistics  
As evident from Table	2, antibiotics prescriptions to children aged 1-11 
years on average increased both in municipalities with mean income 
below and at or above the old cap. The increase was about 2.7 per cent for 
municipalities with mean income below the old cap, and two per cent for 
those with mean income at or above it. However, this figure will naturally 
be higher for municipalities with more children. Therefore, we divide the 
number of prescriptions to children aged 1-11 years (by municipality and 
month) by the number of children in this age group. Employing this 
adjustment the figures are more comparable, and we note that while there 
was an increase in both groups, the increase was about five per cent for 
the municipalities with mean income below the old cap, and less than two 
per cent (about 1.8 to be more precise) in municipalities with mean income 
at or above the old cap. 
 
Table	2	Mean	Antibiotics	Prescriptions	
Mean	antibiotics	prescriptions	for	children	aged	1-11	years	
Municipalities	with	mean	income	 Before	reform	 After	reform	
<	old	cap	 146	 150	
≥	old	cap	 300	 306	
Mean	antibiotics	prescriptions	per	child	aged	1-11	years	
<	old	cap	 0.0358	 0.0376	
≥	old	cap	 0.0482	 0.0491	
Mean	 antibiotics	 prescriptions	 for	 children	 aged	 1-11	 years	 fall	 2005	 and	 fall	 2006	 for	
municipalities	below	and	above	the	old	cap,	respectively.	
 
Municipalities with mean income below the new cap on average have 
significantly fewer children aged 1-5 years as well as 1-11 years, despite no 
significant difference in overall population, and also no significant 
difference in number of older children (aged 12-17 years) (see Table	 3). 
Mean unemployment is significantly lower in the municipalities with 
mean income at or above the new cap (see Table	3). This is not surprising, 
as mean income and unemployment are negatively correlated. 
Key to identifying a causal effect of the reform on children’s antibiotics 
use is that municipalities with mean income at or above the old cap, and 
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municipalities with mean income below the old cap, display parallel 
trends in prescriptions prior to the reform. This is not trivial to assess, as 
data on prescriptions is only available from July 2005, i.e. but a year prior 
to the reform. A further complication is the seasonal variation, with much 
higher use during the flu season. As can be seen in Figure	1, trends are 
roughly parallel. It is also clear from this graph that any significant effect 
of the reform would be due to a decline in prescriptions July and August 
2006 in municipalities with mean income at or above the old cap, as 
beyond that, trends are parallel again. This is somewhat odd, and should 
be kept in mind for the discussion about policy implications. 
 
Table	3	Means	by	Municipalities	with	Mean	Income	Below	and	Above	the	New	Cap,	
Respectively	
Variable	 Mean	<	old	cap	 Mean	≥	old	cap	 Diff	
	 	 	 	
Population	 30931	
(3602)	
40663	
(8567)	
-9732	
(9293)	
#	of	children	aged	1-5	 	
years	(pre-schoolers)	
1649	
(199)	
2887	
(613)	
-1238*	
(644)	
#	of	children	aged	1-11	
years	
3669	
(410)	
6213	
(1293)	
-2544*	
(1357)	
#	children	aged	12-17	
years	
2552	
(242)	
3578	
(731)	
-1027	
(770)	
Unemployment	(%)	 8.03	
(0.0703)	
7.14	
(0.238)	
0.896***	
(0.248)	
Data	from	2005,	 i.e.	prior	to	the	reform,	 is	used	for	these	comparisons.	Two	sample	t-test	with	
unequal	 variances.	 ***)	 Significant	 at	 least	 at	 1%	 level	 Ha:	 diff	 ≠	 0	 Pr(|T|	 >	 |t|)	 =<0.01	 *)	
Significant	at	10%	level	Ha:	diff	≠	0	Pr(|T|	>	|t|)	=<0.1.	Standard	errors	in	parenthesis.	
 
As mentioned above, when employing the proxy for the extent to which 
parents are affected by the reform, we will need to adjust the estimated 
coefficients to get meaningful estimates. Mean and standard deviation for 
the share of the working age population with an income in the category 
covering the old cap as well as the share with income in the category 
covering the old cap and the next category up are used for these 
calculations. These are presented in Table	4. 
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Figure	1	 	 Parallel	trend	
 
Regression	 coefficients	 from	 regressing	 ln(prescriptions)	 on	 the	 binary	 treatment	 indicator	
separately	 for	municipalities	with	mean	 income	at	or	 above	 the	old	 cap	 (treated;	 indicator	=1)	
and	 below	 the	 old	 cap	 (untreated;	 indicator=0)	 for	 each	 month	 July	 2005-December	 2006.	
Vertical	line	at	July	2006,	when	the	cap	was	increased	
 
Table	4	Descriptive	Statistics	for	Income	Categories	Affected	
Share	with	income:	 Mean	 Std.dev.	 Min	 Max	
In	only	the	category	covering	the	old	cap	 0.0177	 0.00555	 0.00884	 0.0607	
In	that	and	the	next	category	up	 0.0355	 0.	00929	 0.0205	 0.	100	
Mean,	standard	deviation,	min,	and	max	for	share	of	the	population	with	income	in	the	category	
covering	the	old	cap	and	including	also	the	next	category	up	for	years	2005	and	2006. 
7 Results  
Below we present the results of estimations of the 
differences-in-differences over time and across municipalities (equation 1 
and 2), and the triple difference, over time and across age groups as well 
as municipalities (equation 3). 
7.1 Difference-in-difference with Binary Treatment Indicator 
When employing the binary treatment variable equal to one for 
municipalities with mean income at or above the old cap, and estimating 
the effect of the raised cap of the benefit for temporary parental leave, we 
find that in the base specification the estimated effect is a reduction by 6.17 
per cent in prescriptions per child (p-value 0.007) (see Table	5, column 1). 
Adding municipality and time fixed effects, as well as a dummy for flu 
season (equal to one for the months October through Mars) slightly 
reduces the absolute value of the estimated effect, but still it is a reduction 
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by 5.39 per cent (p-value 0.009) (see Table	5, column 2). These are estimates 
of the effect of the reform, on children’s antibiotics use, in municipalities 
where parents were more likely affected by the reform. 
 
Table	5	Effect	Estimated	with	Binary	Treatment	Indicator	
	 (1)	 (2)	
VARIABLES	 Prescriptions/child	 Prescriptions/child	
	 	 	
TREATED	 -0.0617***	 -0.0539***	
	 (0.0227)	 (0.0204)	
flu_season	 	 0.523***	
	 	 (0.0299)	
POST	 0.0466***	 	
	 (0.0126)	 	
treat_binary	 0.348***	 	
	 (0.0345)	 	
Municipality	FE	 no	 yes	
Time	FE	 no	 yes	
Observations	 5,221	 5,221	
R-squared	 0.018	 0.580	
Dependent	variable	 is	 ln(prescriptions	per	child	aged	2-11	years).	Coefficient	of	main	 interest	 is	
that	on	TREATED,	an	 interaction	between	the	dummy	POST	equal	to	one	from	July	2006,	when	
the	cap	is	raised,	and	a	dummy	for	mean	income	at	or	above	the	cap.	Data	on	prescriptions	by	
municipality	and	month	July	2005	-	December	2006	is	used.	Robust	standard	errors	clustered	by	
municipality	in	parentheses.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1 
7.2 Difference-in-difference with Approximately Continuous 
Treatment Variable 
Next we turn to the approximately continuous treatment variable, 
using the share of working age population with an income in the category 
covering the old cap (Table	 6, column 1), and including also the next 
category above the cap (Table	6, column 2). The estimates are significant at 
the ten and the five per cent levels, respectively (p-values 0.054 and 0.036) 
(Table	6, columns 1 and 2). 
These coefficients are estimates of the effect of the reform, on children’s 
antibiotics use, if going from a zero share of working age population with 
an income in this/these category/categories to a share equal to one. To get 
more relevant estimates, we can compare at mean shares. Mean share of 
working age population with an income in the category covering the old 
cap is about 0.0177. Mean share with an income in this and the next 
category up is about 0.0355. This gives estimated effects at mean shares of 
about -5.63 per cent and -6.89 per cent, respectively. I.e. these estimates are 
roughly comparable in magnitude to those reported in Table	 5. A one 
standard deviation increase, in the share of working age population with 
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an income in the category covering the old cap, is associated with a 
reduction by 1.77 per cent in children’s antibiotics use. A one standard 
deviation increase, in the share of working age population with an income 
in this and the next category up, is associated with a decrease by 1.80 per 
cent. I.e. the effect is mainly driven by those with an income in the 
category covering the old cap, which is expected, as this is the category for 
which the reform had the largest impact on compensation level.8 
 
Table	6	Effect	Estimated	with	Approximately	Continuous	Treatment	Variable	
	 (1)	 (2)	
VARIABLES	 Closest	inc	cat.	 At	and	above	
	 	 	
share_POST	 -3.183*	 -1.935**	
	 (1.646)	 (0.919)	
flu_season	 0.577***	 0.589***	
	 (0.0455)	 (0.0479)	
Municipality	FE	 yes	 yes	
Time	FE	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 5,221	 5,221	
R-squared	 0.581	 0.581	
Dependent	variable	 is	 ln(prescriptions	per	child	aged	2-11	years).	Coefficient	of	main	 interest	 is	
that	on	share_POST,	which	 is	an	 interaction	between	the	dummy	POST,	equal	 to	one	from	July	
2006,	when	 the	 cap	 is	 raised,	 and	 the	 share	 of	working	 age	 population	with	 an	 income	 in	 the	
category	closest	to	the	old	cap	(column	1)	or	including	also	those	in	the	next	category	above	the	
old	cap	(column	2).	Data	on	prescriptions	by	municipality	and	month	July	2005	-	December	2006	
is	used.	Robust	standard	errors	clustered	by	municipality	in	parentheses.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	
p<0.1. 
7.3 Triple Difference with Older Children as Comparison Group 
Turning now to our third strategy, we exploit the difference in impact 
for different age groups, and differences in share of parents potentially 
affected by the reform. I.e. we estimate equation 3, with the shares of 
working age population with an income in the category covering the old 
cap (Table	7, column 1), and including also the next category above the cap 
(Table	7, column 2). We find a strong and significant effect of the reform. 
The estimates are significant at the one per cent level (both p-values are 
zero to the fourth decimal). (See Table	7, columns 1 and 2.) 
 
                                                
8 The income category covering the old cap includes everyone who went from less than 
80 per cent to an 80 per cent compensation level. In the next category up everyone gets a 
higher level of compensation, but it remains less than 80 per cent of their incomes, as they 
all earn more than the new cap. 
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Table	7	Effect	Estimated	with	Approximately	Continuous	Treatment	Variable	and	
Comparison	Group	
	 (1)	 (2)	
VARIABLES	 Closest	inc	cat.	 At	and	above	
	 	 	
triple	interaction	 -4.653***	 -2.515***	
	 (1.002)	 (0.508)	
flu_season	 0.560***	 0.565***	
	 (0.0389)	 (0.0389)	
Municipality	FE	 yes	 yes	
Time	FE	 yes	 yes	
Age	FE	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 78,300	 78,300	
R-squared	 0.272	 0.272	
Dependent	 variable	 is	 ln(prescriptions	 per	 child).	 Coefficient	 of	 main	 interest	 is	 that	 on	 triple	
interaction,	which	 –	 as	 the	 name	 suggests	 –	 is	 a	 triple	 interaction	 between	 the	 dummy	 POST,	
equal	 to	 one	 from	 July	 2006,	 when	 the	 cap	 is	 raised,	 a	 dummy	 equal	 to	 one	 for	 age	 groups	
affected	by	the	reform	(i.e.	children	aged	2-11	years),	and	the	share	of	working	age	population	
with	an	 income	 in	 the	category	closest	 to	 the	old	cap	 (column	1)	or	 including	also	 those	 in	 the	
next	category	above	the	old	cap	(column	2).	Data	on	prescriptions	by	municipality	and	month	July	
2005	-	December	2006	is	used.	Robust	standard	errors	clustered	by	municipality	in	parentheses.	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1 
 
These are estimates of the effect for children, whose parents are eligible 
for temporary parental leave, relative to children whose parents are not 
(because the children are too old), if the share of working age population 
with an income in the affected category/categories goes from zero to one. 
When multiplied by the mean shares we get estimates of about -8.24 and 
-8.93 per cent, respectively. I.e. antibiotics use is about eight per cent less 
among children, whose parents are eligible for temporary parental leave, 
in municipalities with (close to) mean share of working age population 
with an income in the category covering the old cap for this benefit. It is 
close to nine per cent less for eligible children, in municipalities with (close 
to) a mean share of working age population with an income in the 
category covering the old cap and the next category up. A one standard 
deviation increase in the share of working age population with an income 
in the category covering the old cap, is associated with a reduction by 2.56 
per cent, while a one standard deviation increase in the share of working 
age population with an income in this and the next category up, is 
associated with a decrease by merely 2.34 per cent. I.e. the effect now 
seems to entirely be driven by those with an income in the category 
covering the old cap. These estimates are somewhat larger in absolute 
value, but roughly in the same ballpark, as those obtained with the 
difference-in-differences over time and across municipalities (only). 
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Exploring further if the effect is driven by particular age groups, among 
children whose parents are eligible for temporary parental leave, we 
estimate the effect separately for pre-schoolers (aged 2-5 years) and for 
primary school children (aged 6-11 years), still using older children (aged 
13-17 years) as comparison group. Including only pre-schoolers and older 
children, and estimating equation 3, the estimate is -10.33 (p-value is zero 
to the fourth decimal) (see Table	8, column 1). This translates to about 18.3 
per cent less antibiotics prescriptions per pre-schooler, relative to older 
children, whose parents are no longer eligible for temporary parental 
leave, at mean share of working age population with an income in the 
category covering the old cap. A one standard deviation increase, in the 
share of working age population with an income in the category covering 
the old cap, is associated with a reduction by 5.73 per cent. 
 
Table	8	Effect	estimated	separately	by	age	group,	with	approx.	continuous	treatment	
variable	and	comparison	group	
	 (1)	 (2)	
VARIABLES	 2-5	vs	13-17	 6-11	vs	13-17	
	 	 	
triple	interaction	 -10.33***	 -1.116	
	 (1.296)	 (1.123)	
flu_season	 0.659***	 0.373***	
	 (0.0389)	 (0.0413)	
Municipality	FE	 yes	 yes	
Time	FE	 yes	 yes	
Age	FE	 yes	 yes	
Observations	 46,980	 57,420	
R-squared	 0.296	 0.234	
Dependent	 variable	 is	 ln(prescriptions	 per	 child).	 Coefficient	 of	 main	 interest	 is	 that	 on	 triple	
interaction,	which	 –	 again	 as	 the	 name	 suggests	 –	 is	 a	 triple	 interaction,	 between	 the	 dummy	
POST,	equal	to	one	from	July	2006,	when	the	cap	is	raised,	a	dummy	equal	to	one	for	age	groups	
affected	by	the	reform	(i.e.	children	aged	2-11	years),	and	the	share	of	working	age	population	
with	an	income	in	the	category	closest	to	the	old	cap.	In	the	first	column	only	pre-schoolers	(aged	
2-5	 years)	 and	 older	 children	 (aged	 13-17	 years)	 are	 included.	 In	 column	 2	 pre-schoolers	 are	
excluded.	Data	on	prescriptions	by	municipality	and	month	July	2005	-	December	2006	 is	used.	
Robust	standard	errors	clustered	by	municipality	in	parentheses.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1 
 
When instead excluding pre-schoolers, and estimating equation 3 
separately for children aged 6-11 years relative to older children, we find 
no significant effect (see Table	8, column 2). I.e. the effect found in Table	7 is 
clearly driven by pre-schoolers, who also tend to be more prone to 
infections, and typically consume more antibiotics than older children. 
Besides the higher burden of infections among pre-schoolers, these are 
also children who are too young to be left alone, even for a short period of 
time, implying that, for these children, a parent or other care-giver will 
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have to stay home from work to care for them, for the entire duration of 
their illness.9 
7.4 Robustness 
To test the robustness, we run a placebo test. We do this by estimating a 
variant of equation 1, switching on a dummy in January 2006, and using 
data from July 2005 through June 2006, i.e. from the pre-reform period 
only. The coefficient on the interaction between a dummy equal to one 
from January 2006 and a dummy equal to one for municipalities with 
mean income at or above the old cap is positive and insignificant (see Table	
9). This offers some support for the validity of the results presented above. 
 
Table	9	Placebo	Test	on	Data	from	Pre-reform	Period	
	 (1)	 (2)	
VARIABLES	 Placebo	Jan	2006	 Placebo	Jan	2006	
	 	 	
PLACEBO×treat_bi	 0.0846	 0.0786	
	 (0.0517)	 (0.0487)	
flu_season	 	 0.508***	
	 	 (0.0249)	
PLACEBO	 0.277***	 	
	 (0.0150)	 	
treat_binary	 0.295***	 	
	 (0.0403)	 	
Municipality	FE	 no	 yes	
Time	FE	 no	 yes	
Observations	 3,480	 3,480	
R-squared	 0.109	 0.626	
Placebo	test	on	data	from	pre-reform	period,	July	2005	through	June	2006.	Dependent	variable	is	
ln(prescriptions	 per	 child	 aged	 2-11	 years).	 Coefficient	 of	 main	 interest	 is	 that	 on	
PLACEBO×treat_bi,	 which	 is	 an	 interaction	 between	 the	 dummy	 PLACEBO	 equal	 to	 one	 from	
January	 2006	 and	 treat_binary,	 which	 is	 a	 dummy	 for	mean	 income	 at	 or	 above	 the	 old	 cap.	
Robust	standard	errors	clustered	by	municipality	in	parentheses.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1 
8 Discussion and Concluding Remarks  
We explore the effect on children’s antibiotics use of a more generous 
compensation for temporary parental leave to care for a sick child. We 
exploit an increase in the cap for this benefit, for exogenous variation in 
the level of compensation. Two different approaches to a 
difference-in-difference estimation over time and across municipalities are 
                                                
9 Note to American readers: It is not illegal to leave children home alone in Sweden. 
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employed, in addition to a triple difference over time and across 
municipalities as well as age groups. All results support the hypothesis 
that an increase in the maximum amount of compensation reduces 
antibiotics use among children of relevant ages, if their parents are 
plausibly affected by the reform. 
Both difference-in-difference estimations yield similar results. We find 
effects ranging from -5.39 per cent to -6.89 per cent. This is a 
non-negligible effect. Exploiting variation over time, and across age 
groups, as well as municipalities, we also find a significant and strong 
effect. Relative to older children, antibiotics use is about eight to nine per 
cent less among children, whose parents are eligible for temporary 
parental leave, in a municipality with about mean share of working age 
population with an income in affected categories. This effect is mainly 
driven by children of preschool age; controlling for age specific effects 
capturing that younger children are generally more prone to infections, 
their antibiotics use is reduced by about eighteen per cent relative to older 
children. 
Policy implications are not immediate. While the estimated effects are 
quite large, it is unclear if they represent only a short-term effect, or would 
be sustained in the long run. As noted in the discussion of Figure	1, the 
effect seems to be focused on only two months immediately following the 
implementation. Nonetheless, the consistency of results across 
specifications is still an indication that the level of compensation in social 
security benefits can have important indirect effects; in this case with 
urgent consequences for the possibility to limit antibiotics use and delay 
the spread of resistance. A limitation of our study is that we only have 
access to data at municipality level. Future work should aim at exploring 
the effect at household level and, if possible, look at a reform that is in 
effect for a longer period of time, allowing an investigation of more 
long-term effects, if any. 
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